بررسی نقش تعدیل‌گر استقلال هیئت‌مدیره و پویایی محیط تجاری بر رابطۀ بین تنوع هیئت‌مدیره و ارزش نهایی وجه نقد

نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری، گروه حسابداری، دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه بوعلی‌سینا، همدان، ایران.

2 گروه حسابداری، دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه بوعلی سینا، همدان، ایران

3 دانشیار گروه حسابداری، دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه بوعلی‌سینا، همدان، ایران.

چکیده

مقدمه و اهداف: در سال‌های اخیر، نقش وجوه نقد در تصمیم‌گیری‌های مالی شرکت‌ها بیش‌ازپیش موردتوجه پژوهشگران قرار گرفته است، زیرا میزان کارایی شرکت‌ها در استفاده از منابع نقدی می‌تواند شاخصی از کیفیت مدیریت مالی و حاکمیت شرکتی آن‌ها باشد. با وجود پژوهش‌های متعدد درباره عوامل مالی مؤثر بر ارزش نهایی وجه نقد، بررسی ابعاد غیرمالی و به‌ویژه ویژگی‌های هیئت‌مدیره کمتر موردتوجه قرار گرفته است. تنوع در ترکیب هیئت‌مدیره می‌تواند با گسترش دیدگاه‌ها، مهارت‌ها و تجربیات اعضا، بر کیفیت تصمیم‌گیری و تخصیص منابع مالی اثرگذار باشد. درعین‌حال، استقلال هیئت‌مدیره و پویایی محیط تجاری ممکن است شدت و جهت این رابطه را تغییر دهند. بر این اساس، هدف پژوهش حاضر بررسی تأثیر تنوع هیئت‌مدیره بر ارزش نهایی وجه نقد و تبیین نقش تعدیل‌گر استقلال هیئت‌مدیره و پویایی محیط تجاری بر این رابطه است.



روش‌ها: پژوهش حاضر از نظر هدف، کاربردی و از نظر روش‌شناسی، توصیفی ـ همبستگی و مبتنی بر داده‌های ترکیبی است. جامعه آماری شامل کلیه شرکت‌های پذیرفته‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران طی سال‌های ۱۳۸۶ تا ۱۴۰۳ است که پس از اعمال محدودیت‌ها جهت دستیابی به مشاهدات همگن، ۱۱۶ شرکت در قالب ۲۰۸۸ سال ـ شرکت به‌عنوان نمونه انتخاب شدند. متغیر وابسته، ارزش نهایی وجه نقد و متغیر مستقل، تنوع هیئت‌مدیره است. استقلال هیئت‌مدیره و پویایی محیط تجاری به‌عنوان متغیرهای تعدیل‌گر در پژوهش لحاظ شده‌اند. برای تحلیل داده‌ها از الگوی رگرسیون پانل با کنترل اثرات ثابت سال‌ها و صنایع و برآوردگر حداقل مربعات تعمیم‌یافته (GLS) به همراه تصحیح خوشه‌ای در سطح شرکت، استفاده شده تا ناهمسانی واریانس و همبستگی درون‌شرکتی کنترل گردد.



یافته‌ها: نتایج برآورد مدل‌های رگرسیونی نشان می‌دهد که تنوع هیئت‌مدیره اثر مثبت و معناداری بر ارزش نهایی وجه نقد دارد؛ به‌گونه‌ای که شرکت‌هایی با ترکیب متنوع‌تر از نظر جنسیت، تحصیلات، تجربه و تخصص اعضای هیئت‌مدیره، از کارایی بالاتری در استفاده از وجوه نقد برخوردارند. این یافته مؤید نقش تنوع هیئت‌مدیره در ارتقاء کیفیت تصمیم‌گیری و بهبود نظارت بر سیاست‌های مالی شرکت است. افزون بر آن، میزان این تأثیر در شرکت‌هایی که از هیئت‌مدیره مستقل‌تری برخوردارند، تقویت می‌شود؛ بدین معنا که استقلال اعضای غیرموظف با کاهش تضاد منافع و بهبود شفافیت تصمیم‌های مدیریتی، به افزایش ارزش نهایی وجه نقد منجر می‌شود. همچنین، نتایج نشان می‌دهد که پویایی محیط تجاری نیز در این رابطه نقش تشدید‌کننده دارد؛ به‌طوری‌که در محیط‌های پویا و متغیر، تأثیر مثبت تنوع هیئت‌مدیره بر ارزش نهایی وجه نقد، قوی‌تر است. این امر بیانگر آن است که در شرایط تغییرات سریع بازار و عدم اطمینان بیشتر، شرکت‌های دارای هیئت‌مدیره متنوع‌تر توانایی بالاتری در اتخاذ تصمیم‌های مالی انعطاف‌پذیر و پاسخ‌گو دارند. در مقابل، در محیط‌های کم‌تحول یا شرکت‌های با استقلال کمتر هیئت‌مدیره، رابطه مزبور ضعیف‌تر یا بی‌معنا می‌شود. نتایج آزمون‌های تکمیلی با به‌کارگیری تعریف عملیاتی جایگزین برای متغیر وابستۀ مدل‌ها، مؤید یافته‌های اصلی پژوهش و نشان‌دهندۀ استحکام و پایداری نتایج است.



نتیجه‌گیری: نتایج این پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که تنوع هیئت‌مدیره با تقویت کارایی تصمیم‌گیری مالی و نظارت مدیریتی، ارزش نهایی وجه نقد شرکت را افزایش می‌دهد و این اثر در حضور هیئت‌مدیره مستقل‌تر و در محیط‌های تجاری پویا شدت می‌یابد. بر این اساس، به مدیران و سیاست‌گذاران مالی توصیه می‌شود در طراحی ساختار حاکمیت شرکتی، بر تنوع و استقلال هیئت‌مدیره به‌عنوان عوامل کلیدی ارزش‌آفرینی تمرکز نمایند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Examining the Moderating Role of Board Independence and Business Environment Dynamism on the Relationship between Board Diversity and the Marginal Value of Cash

نویسندگان [English]

  • Maghferah Ahmadi 1
  • Abbas Aflatooni 2
  • Hassan Zalaghi 3
1 Ph.D. Student in Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamedan, Iran.
2 Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamadan, Iran
3 Associate Professor of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamedan, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Introduction: In recent years, the role of cash holdings in corporate financial decision-making has attracted increasing attention from researchers, as the efficiency with which firms utilize their cash resources can serve as an indicator of the quality of their financial management and corporate governance. Despite extensive studies on the financial determinants of the marginal value of cash, the non-financial dimensions-particularly the characteristics of the board of directors-have received comparatively little attention. Board diversity, by broadening the range of perspectives, skills, and experiences among directors, can influence the quality of decision-making and the allocation of financial resources. At the same time, board independence and the dynamism of the business environment may alter the strength and direction of this relationship. Accordingly, the present study aims to examine the effect of board diversity on the marginal value of cash and to explain the moderating roles of board independence and business environment dynamism in this relationship.



Methods: This study is applied in purpose and descriptive-correlational in methodology, employing a panel data approach. The statistical population consists of all firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2007–2024. After applying selection criteria to ensure data homogeneity, 116 firms with a total of 2,088 firm-year observations were selected as the final sample. The dependent variable is the marginal value of cash, while the independent variable is board diversity. Board independence and business environment dynamism are included as moderating variables. Data analysis was conducted using a panel regression model controlling for year and industry fixed effects, and the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator with firm-level clustered standard errors was employed to address heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation.



Results and discussion: The results of the regression models indicate that board diversity has a positive and significant effect on the marginal value of cash. Firms with more diverse boards - in terms of gender, education, experience, and professional background-demonstrate greater efficiency in utilizing their cash holdings. This finding supports the role of board diversity in enhancing decision-making quality and improving oversight of corporate financial policies. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is stronger in firms with more independent boards. The independence of non-executive directors, by mitigating conflicts of interest and increasing the transparency of managerial decisions, contributes to a higher marginal value of cash. The results also reveal that business environment dynamism amplifies this relationship. In dynamic and rapidly changing markets, the positive impact of board diversity on the marginal value of cash becomes stronger, suggesting that in conditions of higher uncertainty and market volatility, firms with more diverse boards possess greater flexibility and responsiveness in financial decision-making. Conversely, in more stable environments or in firms with less independent boards, this relationship weakens or becomes insignificant. Additional robustness tests, using alternative operational definitions of the dependent variable, confirm the main findings and demonstrate the stability and reliability of the results.



Conclusions: The findings of this study indicate that board diversity enhances the marginal value of corporate cash by improving the efficiency of financial decision-making and managerial oversight. This effect becomes stronger in firms with more independent boards and in dynamic business environments. Accordingly, managers and financial policymakers are advised to focus on board diversity and independence as key value-creating factors when designing corporate governance structures.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Blau Index
  • Board Diversity
  • Board Independence
  • Business Environment Dynamism
  • Marginal Value of Cash

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