راهبری شرکتی و هزینه نمایندگی (با رویکرد مبتنی بر مدل) و نقش میانجی سیاست‌های مالی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری مدیریت، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.

2 دانشیار، گروه مدیریت، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.

3 دانشیار، گروه اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.

چکیده

با جدایی مالکیت از مدیریت، راهبری شرکتی در هدایت سیاست‌های مالی مدیریت توسط سهامداران ابزار مناسبی برای کاهش هزینه نمایندگی است. نوآوری این پژوهش، اندازه‌گیری هزینه نمایندگی با رویکرد مبتنی بر مدل (برای اولین بار در جهان) و تعدیل Q توبین با تورم (برای اولین بار در کشور) است. هزینه نمایندگی با 6 سنجه‌ متفاوت سنجیده شده و اثر راهبری شرکتی بر آن با نقش میانجی نسبت بدهی و نسبت تقسیم سود تحلیل شده است. داده‌های شرکت‌های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران و فرابورس ایران به استثنای شرکت‌های واسطه‌گری مالی در بازه زمانی 1385 الی 1398 به کمک مدل‌یابی معادلات ساختاری تحلیل و با توجه به نرمال نبودن داده‌های پژوهش از رویکرد واریانس‌محور آن، روش حداقل مربعات جزیی (PLS) استفاده شده است. طبق نتایج در همه مدل‌های اجرا شده بر مبنای6 سنجه هزینه نمایندگی، راهبری شرکتی بر نسبت سود تقسیمی تاثیر مثبت و نسبت بدهی بر هزینه نمایندگی تاثیر منفی دارد. ضمناً در رویکرد مبتنی بر مدل (جز خطای رگرسیون به‌عنوان سنجه هزینه نمایندگی) (نوآوری پژوهش)، برخلاف سایر سنجه‌های هزینه نمایندگی، مسیر تاثیر راهبری شرکتی بر تقسیم سود و تقسیم سود بر هزینه نمایندگی تایید شد. به دلیل تاثیر نسبت بدهی بر هزینه نمایندگی، اصلاح دیدگاه سهامداران برای هدایت تعدیل نسبت بدهی در راستای هزینه سرمایه پیشنهاد می‌شود.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Corporate Governance and Agency Cost (Model-based Approach) and the Mediating Role of Financial Policies

نویسندگان [English]

  • Sarvenaz Rahimnejad 1
  • Saeed Fathi 2
  • Rozita Moayedfar 3
1 Ph.D. Candidate in Management, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.
2 Associate Prof., Department of Management, University of Isfahan. Isfahan, Iran
3 Associate Prof., Department of Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.
چکیده [English]

With the separation of ownership and management, the corporate governance system is a good tool in the hands of shareholders to reduce agency costs. Developing the literature in which agency cost is calculated by the absolute amount of cash flow or its interaction with growth opportunities, we measure it with a model-based approach. The second innovation is the adjustment of Tobin`s Q with inflation. Agency costs have been measured in 6 different proxies and their impactability from corporate governance has been analyzed with the mediating role of debt and dividend ratio. The data of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and Iran Fara Bourse except for financial intermediary companies in the period 2006 to 2020 have been analyzed using structural equations modeling and due to the non-normality of data, its variance-based approach, partial least squares (PLS) method is used. According to the results in all models based on one of the 6 proxies of agency cost, corporate governance has a positive effect on the dividend ratio and secondly, the debt ratio reduces agency costs. In the model-based approach, unlike other measures of agency costs, the path of corporate governance on dividend and dividend on agency costs was confirmed. Because of the impact of the debt ratio on model-based agency costs, shareholders must adjust the debt ratio leading to lower agency costs.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Corporate Governance
  • Agency Cost
  • Financial Policies

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چشم انداز مدیریت مالی
دوره 12، شماره 39
مهر 1401
صفحه 33-61

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